have challenged the field, revealing the remarkable capacity of the mental system to efficiently adapt to the environment in the absence of attentional capacity, consciousness, or volition. However, although "auto-motive" researchers (Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al., 2001; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001 ) have adduced compelling evidence that goals are mentally represented and may be unconsciously activated and pursued, the question remains as to how implicit self-regulatory processes, as they have essentially described them, may be conceptually and/or empirically distinguished from other automatic, activation-based phenomena, including semantic and procedural priming (for discussion of this issue, see Kruglanski et al., 2002; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004) . This question will be the focus of this article.
As discovered decades ago, priming of semantic concepts increases their accessibility, facilitating processing of related constructs (see Neely, 1977) . For example, after reading the word lamp, people may become faster at reading the word light than without priming. Increased semantic activation due to priming also may engender perceptual assimilation. For instance, if participants are exposed to aggression-related concepts by unscrambling sentences such as "leg her break he" (Srull & Wyer, 1979) , they may use this activated knowledge in rendering judgments of ambiguously aggressive target individuals, such that these targets come to be viewed as more hostile (for a review, see Higgins, 1996; Wyer, 2004 ; for a meta-analysis, see DeCoster & Claypool, 2004) .
As alluded to above, priming has also been posited to activate goals, representations of desired end-states, thereby eliciting action consistent with goal attainment. For example, after processing words related to achievement, people have been found to become more competitive . However, regardless of whether goals have indeed been activated, goal-relevant primes may enhance the accessibility of goal-related knowledge constructs. For example, a shoe advertisement may trigger the goal to buy new footwear, promoting enhanced accessibility of constructs related to this goal and thereby engendering increased efficiency at detecting shoe stores. However, the question remains: How can we determine whether processing the advertisement has activated a goal or merely enhanced the accessibility of semantic constructs related to this goal? Restated, did the advertisement ultimately increase shoe-store detection by triggering a goal to find new shoes or by simply rendering the concept of shoes more active in long-term memory? In this article, we outline some principles of goal pursuit that may help to answer such questions. First, however, we briefly review some of the key findings that have been marshaled in support of the notion that goals are automatically activated, the theoretical precepts that have been advanced to account for these effects, and the means that have been taken to distinguish between effects of semantic versus goalrelated accessibility.
EVIDENCE FOR AUTOMATIC GOAL ACTIVATION AND PURSUIT
The empirical finding that may have been most seminal in advancing the notion of automatic goal activation is Bargh, Chen, and Burrows's (1996, Experiment 2) striking demonstration that participants primed with concepts related to the elderly stereotype (e.g., Florida, old, lonely) walked more slowly down a hallway compared to those primed with words unrelated to age (e.g., thirsty, clean, private). In another influential experiment, Bargh et al. (1996, Experiment 1) showed that priming the trait constructs of rude versus polite (using different trait-related words) resulted in participants interrupting an experimenter sooner versus later, respectively. The two effects were based on consciously activated knowledge that had an unintended influence on further behavior. Yet another pivotal finding was reported by Bargh et al. (1996, Experiment 3) , who discovered that subliminal priming of a young, African American male face led participants to respond with more hostility (a stereotypic behavior associated with this social category) to provocation by the experimenter, as compared to priming with a Caucasian face. This experiment shows that even though social information such as a face is not consciously perceived, constructs associated with the stimulus can unintentionally and unconsciously drive behavior with minimal or no demand for controlled processing (see Bargh, 1994) .
These effects have been replicated and extended, and it is now accepted as common knowledge that exposure to specific trait constructs, actual behaviors, or social group members (whose stereotypes contain trait and behavioral constructs) can result in the nonconscious expression of the activated behaviors (for review, see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001) : Although there are exceptions (e.g., Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) , priming a trait, a stereotype, or a behavior results in an increased likelihood that individuals will perform the primed behavior. We will refer to these effects as behavioral assimilation effects (for a recent review, see Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, in press) . Assimilation occurs if a subsequent behavior reflects the implication of the prime, whereas contrast or unconscious anchoring occurs if the subsequent behavior reflects the opposite (see DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; .
Assimilation effects have not only been shown to alter behaviors but also to alter performance level on speed tests, intelligence tests, memory tests, creativity tests, and flexibility tests. For example, priming "elderly" increases response latencies on lexical decision tasks (Dijksterhuis, Spears, & Lépinasse, 2001; Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002) and decreases performance on memory tasks (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Dijksterhuis, Bargh, & Miedema, 2000 ; but see Levy, 1996) and priming "professor" leads to more correct responses to general knowledge questions, whereas priming "soccer hooligan" leads to less correct responses . Priming "politician" results in participants producing longer essays than those not primed (with "long-windedness" as an associated trait of politicians; , and priming "punk" leads to higher creativity than priming "engineer" (Förster, Friedman, Butterbach, & Sassenberg, 2005) .
Other researchers have demonstrated effects of priming on performance. For example, priming "helpful" facilitates helpful behaviors (Macrae & Johnston, 1998) , priming "conformity" increases consensus (Epley & Gilovich, 1999) , priming "intelligent" leads to more correct responses on general knowledge questions (compared to priming "stupid"; , priming "creativity" enhances creative thinking (Sassenberg, Kessler, & Mummendey, 2007) , and priming "flexibility" reduces perseverance on the Wisconsin Card-Sorting task (Hassin & Bargh, 2005) , to name a few.
Finally, exposing participants to actual behaviors also has led to similar effects, in that the observed behavior tends to be imitated (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) . Mimicry of an interaction partner's behavior (e.g., facial touching or foot shaking) has been shown to occur without awareness of having observed the partner behavior at issue or one's own expression of the behavior. More recently, Aarts, Gollwitzer, and Hassin (2004) argued that people may not only automatically mimic concrete behaviors but may also adopt and pursue a goal that is implied by another person's behavior (given that this goal is socially acceptable). Their research on goal contagion shows that if participants are presented with behavioral descriptions implying a certain goal, they may initiate this behavior if an opportunity is provided to do so, even without being aware of the influence.
WHY DOES PRIMING AFFECT BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE?
To account for behavioral assimilation effects, researchers have introduced both nonmotivational models stating that semantic or associative links between concepts and behavior exist and automatically elicit action and motivational models that involve the notion of goals to predict automatic goal pursuit.
One common nonmotivational explanation for automatic behavioral assimilation is based on the assumption of a perception-behavior link (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; . This link is described as an unintentional mechanism whereby action is directly associated with perception so that perceiving a stimulus may have a direct effect on behavior. James's (1890) principle of ideo-motor action is perhaps the first theory to suggest that actions are directly connected to mental representations of the same actions. According to James, the mere act of thinking about a behavior increases the likelihood that the behavior will be carried out, given an appropriate situation for the behavior to be expressed. Notably, the source of the activation is irrelevant for the ensuing behavior-both external priming (e.g., seeing someone act in the manner at issue) and an internal thought about a behavior may result in carrying out a corresponding behavior.
This account resembles classic explanations for semantic priming (Collins & Loftus, 1975) . Presumably, semantic priming occurs because activation spreads in the semantic (or associative) network and increases the activation potential of connected constructs, thereby making their activation more likely. According to the notion of a perception-behavior link, unconscious behavioral priming occurs in much the same way, only some of the constructs in the semantic or associative network are behaviors rather than constructs. Activation spreads from the prime to the behavior and makes it more likely to be carried out than if it had not been primed. As with semantic priming, this principle predicts that the more often and the more recently a concept has been activated, the more likely it will drive enactment of the corresponding behavior given that the behavior is applicable to the situation (see Wheeler et al., in press) .
To summarize, the perception-behavior link and related accounts of automatic social behavior (Kawakami et al., 2002) posit direct activation of behavioral representations by the act of perception: "Perceptual inputs are translated automatically into corresponding behavioral outputs" (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001, p. 1) . However, there are alternative accounts. One muchvaunted possibility is that a prime activates a goal to perform a certain task (Bargh, 1990 (Bargh, , 1997 . Inasmuch as goals can be represented in memory (see Kruglanski, 1996; Moskowitz et al., 2004; Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2003) , it is possible that, for example, the verbal prime "aggressive" not only activates semantic associates of aggression that eventually lead to aggressive behavior but also or alternatively activates the goal to aggress against a certain person, thereby eliciting automatic goal pursuit.
1 This is because certain features may be frequently and habitually linked to certain goals (Bargh, 1997) . In a similar vein, people (Aarts et al., 2004; Fitzsimon & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003) or environments can remind one unconsciously or consciously of one's goals (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003) . The aforementioned examples refer to situations in which the prime and the goal are connected via a history of frequent co-occurrence. It is important to note, however, that such connections also may be established by a single act of volition, that is, the formation of an implementation intention (Gollwitzer, 1990 (Gollwitzer, , 1993 Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999) . For example, when a student decides that at the end of a biology class she will go to the computing center to write an e-mail to her mother, biology class may activate the goal to write such an e-mail to her mother automatically, with little or no awareness.
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Aside from this, it is also possible that a prime activates a procedure. For example, Mussweiler and Förster (2000) primed women and men with sex-related constructs and found cognitive accessibility of aggression-related actions to be enhanced for both genders compared to an unprimed control group (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000 , Experiment 1). However, in another experiment, an increase of overtly aggressive behavior after sex priming was only observed for men (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000, Experiment 3) . The authors argued that procedural priming took place: Because men frequently act aggressively in sexual situations, the procedures involved in this behavior are more likely elicited when they are mentally simulating sex (due to situational exposure to sex-related concepts). Because women are usually the victims of sexual aggression, for them, activation of a cognitive procedure to detect cues of aggression is more likely than activation of aggressive behavioral scripts (as found in another study; Mussweiler & Förster, 2000, Experiment 4) . Thus, even though the semantic activation of aggression occurred for both genders, the procedures elicited by the primes were different for men versus women (cf. Schooler, 2002; Smith & Branscombe, 1987) . Assuming the results of this study indeed reflect dissociation between perception and behavior, they highlight the difficulty of distinguishing whether a given manipulation has primed a semantic concept, a goal, or a procedural routine.
SEMANTIC PRIMING, PROCEDURAL PRIMING, OR GOALS?
How, then, can we tell whether a prime activated a goal as opposed to only producing semantic priming? Let us first emphasize that these are different outcomes: Not every effect of priming activates a goal. For example, it is difficult to see how goals might be involved in the effect of priming "lamp" on subsequent (faster) readings of "light."
3 Two seemingly obvious criteria to distinguish between goal priming and semantic priming seem to us rather problematic: using the fact that the effect is behavioral as an indicator for primed goals, and using the fact that the manipulations involved motivational, as opposed to only semantic, content as an indicator of primed goals.
First and foremost, the first account is misleading because some internalized cognitive operations, such as judgment or memory, may well involve goals (e.g., fairness vs. accuracy goals, impression formation vs. memorization goals). Second, theories such as the ideomotor theory suggest that behavior may result from sheer conceptual priming. For instance, the results of the aforementioned study by , in which elderly primed participants walked slower, may be seen as resulting from the operation of the perception-behavior link, a process that in no way requires the involvement of goals. According to this account, semantic concepts are directly linked to motor representations. Thus, the concept of slow, which was presumably activated by the elderly category, could directly lead to slow walking. If this is true, one cannot tell from a behavioral measure that a goal was activated.
The phenomenon of procedural priming introduces another difficulty with using behavioral outcomes as a hallmark of activated goals because it presumably involves goalless actions (see . Procedural priming refers to priming of procedures-at the priming phase, people perform or are led to mentally simulate an action and then (facilitating) carryover effects on the performance of related actions are examined. For example, solving analytical reasoning problems may activate procedures used in such tasks, thereby transiently facilitating the ability to solve related problems (Schooler, 2002) . Notably, experimental demonstration of procedural priming does not require learning of novel procedures. Rather, the action performed at the priming stage is typically overlearned to such an extent that a few more instances of practice make virtually no difference (e.g., adding numbers, inferring traits from behavior).
The distinction between semantic priming and procedural priming is best exemplified by a study by Smith and Branscombe (1987) , who replicated a classic experiment on the effect of priming on disambiguation of the behavior of a target person (Srull & Wyer, 1979) . In addition to the original priming group, in which participants unscrambled sentences describing hostile behaviors (e.g., "leg her break he"), they added a procedural priming condition, in which participants were presented with the same sentences in an unscrambled form and were asked to choose the matching trait (e.g., hostile). Inferring traits from behavior was, in fact, the procedure people needed to employ when judging the target person in the second phase. After either 15 s or 15 min, participants rated the aggressiveness of a description of a vaguely aggressive behavior. Priming traits (i.e., unscrambling sentences) had an assimilative effect only after a short delay, but procedural priming continued to have this effect after a longer delay. It seems that participants practiced the procedure of extracting traits from behavior and that making this procedural knowledge accessible facilitated making such inferences at the test stage.
Notably, procedural priming also may involve fairly generic cognitive processes, such as processing styles, because processes elicited in one task may carry over to another task. Of relevance here is Schooler's (2002; Schooler, Fiore, & Brandimonte, 1997 ) theory of processing shifts, which assumes that a cognitive procedure that is activated in the course of engaging in one task remains active and is transferred to subsequent tasks. Transfer-appropriate processing shifts are said to result when the residually activated procedures are beneficial for subsequent processing, whereas transfer-inappropriate shifts are said to result when the procedures at hand impair subsequent processing. For example, Macrae and Lewis (2002) found that face recognition was enhanced following a global processing task and was impeded following a local processing task. This was presumably the case because the encoding of faces profits from holistic processing. Procedural priming, like semantic priming, does not necessarily induce goal pursuit. For example, in Macrae and Lewis's (2002) experiment, it was probably not the case that global processing instilled in participants a particular goal. Rather, it facilitated performing certain mental operations (e.g., to process information in a more holistic way) by virtue of making them more accessible.
Can we decide that goals have been activated simply because the manipulation clearly involved motivational content, such as the use of verbs implying goal-directed action or intention? For example, if we tell participants to search for the word aggress among other words, this may indeed activate the goal of acting aggressively. However, again, if as the result of this manipulation the same participants exhibit an enhanced accessibility of constructs related to aggression, are we to attribute enhanced accessibility to semantic priming (i.e., merely mentioning the word aggression) or to an active goal (i.e., to seek out stimuli related to current concerns)? Likewise, are individuals primed with the word aggress more likely to find the experimenter impolite and therefore aggress against him because they perceive an aggressive response to be more appropriate or, in contrast, are aggressive means to pursue one's goal more accessible (interrupting vs. waiting and suffering)? It is not easy to find manipulation checks in the literature that certify that goals have indeed been activated; moreover, it is unclear as to what shape such checks should take (for a similar challenge, see Wheeler & Petty, 2001) . Explicit checks are problematic, not only because their validity is called into question by the fact that individuals lack introspective insight into their motives (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) but because administration of such checks following implicit or subliminal goal manipulations will bring goals to consciousness, undermining the ability to draw conclusions regarding the automaticity of goal pursuit. Furthermore, in many cases, asking questions about motivation (e.g., How motivated were you to complete the task?) seems redundant to the participants and may violate conversational norms (Schwarz, 1994) , thus undermining the diagnosticity of self-reports.
Thus, it seems difficult to conclude from the sheer nature of the dependent or independent variable whether an effect was driven by semantic priming, perceptionbehavior links, procedural priming, or goal pursuit. It is especially difficult to infer goals from the independent variable in cases of subliminal priming or unconscious goal activation. And it becomes even more obvious that manipulation checks in these cases would exclude selfreports because people do not even know that concepts (goals, procedures, or concepts) were activated. We believe that effects of goal activation are qualitatively different from those of semantic or procedural priming and suggest a systematic means of distinguishing these effects. Some researchers have begun to address such issues Moskowitz et al., 2004; Wheeler & Petty, 2001 ) and discussed how different types of priming may differentially influence behavior. In the discussion that follows, we will integrate and expand on their ideas. We propose to do so by examining the processes of goal pursuit. In the remainder of this article, we will examine seven principles derived from research on motivation that may be useful in distinguishing goal-priming effects from non-goal-priming effects. We are by no means suggesting that these principles are exhaustive. However, we hope that they will prove useful for researchers, particularly those studying automatic goal activation.
SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF GOAL ACTIVATION
Goal activation may be identified by a set of features that derive from and often cut across numerous theories of self-regulation. In short, we suggest that these features may distinguish goal-priming effects from effects of semantic or procedural priming. These principles are as follows:
1. Goal-priming effects involve value. 2. Goal-priming effects involve postattainment decrements in motivation. 3. Goal-priming effects involve gradients as a function of distance to the goal. 4. Goal-priming effects are proportional to the product of expectancy and value. 5. Goal-priming effects involve inhibition of conflicting goals. 6. Goal-priming effects involve the operation of self-control processes. 7. Goal-priming effects are moderated by equifinality and multifinality.
We now turn to discussing these principles and how they may help distinguish between goal-related effects, those reflecting goal priming, and effects that do not necessarily involve goals. We will summarize studies that exemplify such principles, although we admit, sometimes existing studies do not provide the best example for such an effect. When existing studies may be interpreted in terms of semantic priming, we propose possible extensions of these studies that in our view would serve to offer more conclusive evidence for the principle.
Goal-Priming Effects Involve Value
In the present context, we wish to discuss three aspects of the connection between goals and value. First, goals change value-they make people assign positive value to things that are conducive for goal achievement and negative value to things that are detrimental for goal achievement. Second, goals involve emotion and energy mobilization. People feel happy, satisfied, and/or relieved when they achieve a goal; they feel frustrated, tense, and/or depressed when they fail to achieve the goal; and they feel energized, eager, or vigilant in the process of striving toward the goal. Third, goals are sensitive to changes in value-they become stronger or weaker if value increases or decreases, respectively. Let us examine how each of these aspects of goals may help us distinguish between semantic priming and goal priming.
Goals affect value.
Most generally, people want to attain positive end states and avoid negative end states. But what is good and what is bad varies tremendously from person to person and, more important for our purposes (and even more dramatically), from situation to situation. For example, when we need to find a screwdriver to assemble furniture, the value of that object increases relative to a state in which no such goal exists. We believe that priming a goal should increase the value of the end state and the value of objects and actions that are perceived as conducive to goal attainment. Priming a semantic construct, on the other hand, would not necessarily have the same effect. For example, if priming "furniture" activated the goal to assemble furniture, then the value of a screwdriver may increase, but when it only activated the semantic construct of furniture, no such effect on value would be observed.
Of importance, goals have the power to construct and reconstruct value in a way that does not necessarily reflect preexisting, overlearned associations between constructs and evaluations (see Ach, 1910; Custers & Aarts, 2005; Lewin, 1951) . 4 For example, if our only chance to get a screwdriver and therefore assemble our new furniture is to borrow one from a neighbor, an excitatory link might be created between "neighbor" and "furniture," a link that did not exist in the associative network before that situation. Moreover, positive value would be added to the concept "neighbor" (or the association between neighbor and a mental representation coding for evaluative positivity would be strengthened; Bargh, 1997) . More generally, a goal pursuit system is capable of structuring and restructuring the associative network in line with the actor's goals and the situational affordances, a point to which we will return when discussing other principles as well.
It is true that semantic priming may affect value via disambiguation. For example, priming "aggression" may enhance perceptions of another person as aggressive, thus also making these impressions more negative compared to a nonpriming condition. As another example, priming "thirsty" may enhance the positive value of the word water because it will make it more likely to be disambiguated as drinking water rather than, for example, flood water. Change of value due to disambiguation is not indicative of a primed goal. Thus, researchers that use change in value of goalrelated constructs to demonstrate primed goals may be advised to make sure that such changes were not merely the result of the prime's effects on the way the target word is interpreted (e.g., by making the target words nonambiguous).
Many studies have shown that primed goals and primed needs affect the value of target constructs, but in these studies, associative links and disambiguation were not ruled out. For example, priming the goal of studying enhanced the value of academic concepts (e.g., library, college) and reduced the value of nonacademic temptations (e.g., television, chat; Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2007) . Thirst enhanced the value of water as assessed in implicit measures (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) . In both examples, value was assessed implicitly via affective priming. In both studies, however, the prime and the target constructs were semantically associated and the target was potentially ambiguous in value; therefore, these studies do not rule out the possibility that value was in fact affected by semantic priming.
It is also useful to note that instrumental value changes in the course of goal pursuit. In our example, the neighbor would increase in positive value before he helps us with the tool, but his instrumental value would decrease sharply after he gives us the tool. Water would increase in positive value as long as the goal to drink exists but will lose positive value once thirst is quenched. Such patterns of value change would thus serve as a further indication of an active goal.
In a recent study by Ferguson and Bargh (2004, Experiment 1) , participants worked on a word creation game. Whereas some were asked to perform well because they would get points for each solution (the achievement goal condition), others were not (the control condition). All participants completed an implicit evaluation measure with primes related to the goal (e.g., compete, achieve, win) and primes unrelated to the goal. In addition, some completed the implicit evaluation measure before finishing the word game (the unfulfilled goal condition), whereas some had to complete the game (the fulfilled goal condition). Results showed that implicit evaluations of goal-related stimuli (i.e., slower responses to negative targets after presentation of goal primes) were more favorable in the goal condition only if the goal has not been fulfilled. Thus, goal fulfillment renders formerly favorably valued objects less favorable because they lose utility. Notably, in Ferguson and Bargh's study, the goal was not primed but was induced explicitly. We are not aware of research that has demonstrated a similar effect with primed goals. If demonstrated, however, such a pattern of change in value would be indicative of a primed goal rather than a primed semantic construct.
Goals involve emotion.
Closely related to value are emotions. People feel frustrated, angry, or disappointed if goal attainment is blocked and they feel happy, relieved, or satisfied if they attain the goal. If a prime activates such emotions, then most likely the primes induced a goal. Further support for an active goal would be obtained if emotions follow the course that would have been predicted by active goals-tension, eagerness, and vigilance before fulfillment; happiness and relief after fulfillment; disappointment and anxiety after failure. To the best of our knowledge, no such studies have been conducted. In fact, we can only speculate that these emotions, which typically accompany pursuit of conscious goals (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Friedman, 1999) , also characterize pursuit of goals that were activated via priming. If this were to be demonstrated, however, the elicitation of emotions that characterize goal pursuit would demonstrate goal priming as opposed to priming of semantic constructs. Notably, it is possible that emotions bring the activated goal to awareness. Thus, if people are happy or disappointed because they fulfilled or failed to attain a certain goal that was unintentionally activated, they may infer that a goal was activated. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research examining such inference processes. It also would be interesting to see whether these inferences are invariably correct.
Goals are affected by value. People pursue things that they value, and the extent of their motivation depends on the value of the end state. Therefore, if an effect of priming may be shown to depend on the value of the prime, then it is likely that a goal, rather than a semantic construct, has been primed. Aarts et al. (2004) showed effects of prime value on goal priming. In one experiment, they primed participants with descriptions of people who worked for money or on a voluntary basis. Subsequently, they were told that if time would allow it, they could earn cash by performing a task following the one on which they were currently working. The time participants took to finish working on the current task served as an indicator as to how strongly participants were motivated to earn cash. In an ostensibly unrelated task, the researchers also measured how much participants needed money. They found that participants who read about someone with the implied goal of making money were faster to finish the task in time to do the money task, but this only happened for those participants who, by self-report, needed money. The results show that goal priming only takes place if the primed behavior is valued by the participants (in the present experiment, if they needed the money).
Conceptually similar results were demonstrated by Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna (2002) , who showed effects of subliminal priming on behavior and evaluation in a state of need but not when needs were absent. In their studies, some participants were made thirsty, whereas other participants were made nonthirsty before being primed with names of drinks. Subliminal priming of thirst-related words led to more beverage consumption only for those participants who were primed with thirst-related words and who were thirsty compared to all other participants. In a second study, only thirsty participants were tested. They were primed with words related to thirst or with words unrelated to thirst and then evaluated a thirst-quenching drink and a less thirstquenching drink that was said to be electrolyte restoring. Thirst-primed participants, more than those not primed by thirst, assigned positive value to the thirstquenching drink but not to the other drink.
Similarly, Shah (2003) found that goals can be primed by subliminally exposing participants to names of significant others. He showed that commitment, goal accessibility, and goal pursuit were enhanced when participants were primed with a significant other that valued this goal (e.g., their mother valued achievement), whereas the opposite was true when the significant other did not like the goal (e.g., their friend preferred affiliation goals over achievement). The priming effect was moderated by liking or closeness to the significant other who valued the goal. For example, if people liked their mother and the mother valued achievement, then participants worked harder on a task and were more committed after "mother" priming.
Another way to increase the value of end states is by introducing discrepancies (Higgins, 2006; Lewin, 1951) . In a recent experiment, Moskowitz, Li, and Kirk (2007) reminded participants of their failure to be an egalitarian person. On the basis of earlier research, they assumed that this would enhance the value of showing egalitarian behavior (Moskowitz et al., 1999) . Those participants showed in subsequent tasks less implicit stereotyping and a higher activation of egalitarian concepts when exposed to stimuli that are related to a stereotyped group. It is possible to contend that the reminder of ones' failures to be egalitarian increased the value of showing egalitarianism, and a goal to be egalitarian was activated when exposed to a cue regarding a stereotyped group. For our purposes, it is interesting to examine the possibility of inferring a primed goal if it affects the value of the end state to a greater extent after a discrepancy to the goal has been activated than in the absence of such a discrepancy. Cesario, Plaks, and Higgins (2006) proposed that upon perception of a social group member, the perceiver's motivational system begins to prepare for an interaction with the primed target. The specific outputs of this preparation depend not only on characteristics of the target ("Is the target threatening?" "Is the target rude?") but also on one's evaluation of the target ("Do I like this target?" "Do I want to approach or avoid this target?") and the context of the interaction. Cesario et al. (2006) primed participants with the elderly stereotype or the youth stereotype and examined their walking speed. In addition, they assessed participants' attitudes toward the elderly and toward youth with an implicit attitude measure (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) . The results showed that for participants primed with "elderly," as positivity of attitudes toward the elderly increased, walking speed decreased, whereas for participants primed with "youth," the opposite occurred-positivity of attitudes toward youth was associated with increased walking speed.
A critic may argue that associative networks varied for people who do versus do not like the elderly. More specifically, it may be argued that for the former, but not for the latter, walking slower was associated with (and triggered by) the elderly prime. Would similar results emerge if the value of the primed group were manipulated rather than assessed? A recent study by Epstude and Förster (2007) seems to provide an affirmative answer.
In one of their studies, Epstude and Förster (2007) asked participants to sort cards that could be categorized only by either shape or color. Prior to this task, a minimal group manipulation was administered (Swinney, 2000; Turner, 1978) , in which all participants completed an alleged personality test, which was used to assign them to groups. Half of the participants received feedback that they had a concave personality, whereas others were told that they had a convex personality (cf. Otten & Wentura, 1999) . Before participants started sorting the cards, they were asked to look at examples on the computer of how other participants sorted the cards to get an idea about the task. Half of the photographs on the screen showed sorting based on color, whereas the other half showed sorting on the basis of shape. However, before the presentation of the pictures, participants were subliminally primed with the concepts "convex" or "concave." For half of the participants, convex always co-occurred with shape sorting and concave with color sorting; for the other half of the participants, convex always co-occurred with color sorting and concave with shape sorting. Thus, in some conditions, shapes were associated with the ingroup and color with the outgroup; in others, shapes were associated with the outgroup and color with the ingroup.
The results of this study showed that participants were more likely to sort the cards according to the criteria of their ingroup. For example, if convex was subliminally primed before shapes and participants thought they were in the convex group, then they would tend to sort the cards by shape as well. This was the case despite the fact that group membership was minimal, the priming of group membership before participants received alleged examples of other participants was subliminal, and participants did not report any relationship between the personality tests and the sorting task. Notably, the effects in Epstude and Förster (2007) were moderated by identification with the ingroup. More specifically, after they had received feedback about their performance in the so-called personality test, participants were asked how much they identified with the convex or concave personality groups. Results showed that the more participants identified with their respective group, the more they imitated group behavior.
In sum, and most pertinent to the issue at hand, it seems that people automatically imitate behavior or start actions upon goal priming only if the primed goal has value to them. Value can be derived from the situation, as in the above-mentioned case, where ingroup members ostensibly shared it. The studies show that this can happen even if the association of a certain behavior with group membership has been experimentally manipulated (rather than preexisting) and unconsciously perceived.
Goal-Priming Effects Involve Postattainment Decrements in Motivation
With its roots in Lewin's (1926;  see also Lewin, 1951) field theory, the Zeigarnik effect was demonstrated whereby people remember interrupted tasks better than completed tasks (Zeigarnik, 1927 ; for reviews, see Butterfield, 1964; Heckhausen, 1991; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982) . Presumably, this occurs because interruption preserves the goal to complete the task and maintains the goal-related tension, whereas task completion releases the tension and reduces memory for the task. More recently, this logic has been applied to social cognitive research on accessibility as well. Liberman and Förster (2005) argued that although Lewin and Zeigarnik did not formulate their findings in terms of accessibility, the free recall measure they employed could be interpreted in this manner (see also Tulving & Patterson, 1968 ). The Zeigarnik effect could then suggest that goals enhance the accessibility of goal-related constructs, and goal fulfillment reduces this accessibility.
The most direct evidence for postfulfillment inhibition comes from Marsh, Hicks, and Bink (1998) , who used a lexical decision task to examine the accessibility of intended actions both prior to and after goal completion. In this lexical decision task, participants had to indicate as quickly and as accurately as they could whether a string of letters was a word or a nonword. Faster lexical decisions on semantic associates of a construct indicate a higher accessibility of the construct (Neely, 1991) . First, replicating an earlier study by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) , they found that before completion, accessibility of intended actions was enhanced relative to unintended (i.e., to-be-observed) actions. Second, it also was found that after performing the action, accessibility of the performed action was inhibited and in fact lower than that of observed actions, a result that is in line with the notion of postfulfillment inhibition. Marsh and his colleagues (1998) conducted their studies within the framework of prospective memory, and the goals they examined placed a considerable burden on working memory-they involved memorizing (and, in the goal condition, also executing) a series of actions (e.g., distribute the cutlery, sharpen the pencil, pour the water, spray the aerosol, stack the articles). It could be, then, that inhibition after completion is only characteristic of situations in which memory is overloaded and the system seeks to refresh working memory.
Recently, Förster, Liberman, and Higgins (2005) obtained similar findings with less memory-taxing goals.
In a series of studies, participants looked through a series of pictures with the goal of finding and reporting to the experimenter once they had found a picture of glasses sequentially followed by a picture of scissors. They were told that there would be one and only one such combination in the entire set of stimuli. Participants in the control, no-goal condition looked through the same pictures without being instructed to find a target. Specifically, glasses and scissors were mentioned to them as examples of stimuli that they might see but they did not receive any special instructions about these stimuli. Participants in both groups looked through four blocks of pictures. Pictures of glasses and pictures of scissors appeared a number of times among the stimuli but the target combination appeared only once, in the third block. Thus, Blocks 1 and 2 constituted the prefulfillment stage and Blocks 3 and 4 constituted the postfulfillment stage.
After each block of pictures, participants performed a lexical decision task similar to the one mentioned above. Words related to glasses, words unrelated to glasses, and nonwords were presented randomly, and participants had to indicate as quickly and as accurately as they could whether a string of letters was a word or a nonword. In this way, accessibility of goal-related and goal-unrelated constructs was examined both before and after goal fulfillment, and it was compared to the accessibility of the same constructs in a control, no-goal condition. The results showed that, as predicted, in the goal condition, accessibility of goal-related words was enhanced prior to goal fulfillment. Furthermore, it increased from Block 1 to Block 2. Inhibition of goalrelated constructs was evident immediately after fulfillment, in Block 3. Notably, postfulfillment inhibition was evident both in comparing the postfulfillment stage to the prefulfillment stage and in comparing the goal condition to the control, no-goal condition. It is interesting to note that postfulfillment inhibition was partially released later, in Block 4, indicating that such inhibition is eventually released (for a detailed discussion on this effect, see .
We argue that diminution of accessibility (i.e., inhibition) after goal completion is another mechanism that distinguishes goal priming and semantic priming. From the perspective of semantic priming models Higgins, 1996; Wyer, 2004) , goal attainment merely constitutes activation of a goalrelated construct, and therefore, it should increase rather than decrease accessibility. To illustrate, in the experiments by , participants had to mention the glasses-scissors combination to the experimenter as soon as they saw it. According to traditional models of semantic priming, ongoing consideration of and search for these target objects should continually increase their activation levels, thereby increasing their accessibility to consciousness even after goal fulfillment (Higgins, 1996) . Thus, the finding of postfulfillment inhibition, as opposed to increased or merely persistent activation, may distinguish accessibility from goals from accessibility that is due to semantic priming. For example, if a researcher wishes to investigate effects from subliminal activation of goals, then she might measure accessibility of the goal after the goal has been completed. She should expect a decline of accessibility relative to baseline after goal fulfillment.
Indeed, Liberman and Förster (2000) used this specific feature of inhibition after fulfillment to advance a motivational theory of postsuppressional rebound. They reasoned that people may activate the goal to engage in the suppressed action while they are trying to suppress it. People may infer this goal from suppression difficulty and failure to suppress (Förster & Liberman, 2001) . For example, they may think, "If it is so difficult for me not to think of the cake, then it must be the case that I really want to eat it." In line with the principle of goal activation, Liberman and Förster (2000) reasoned that once a goal is activated, it renders goal-related information accessible. Furthermore, they assumed that goal-related accessibility is different from accessibility due to semantic priming in that goal-related accessibility should decrease upon goal fulfillment. In an experiment, Liberman and Förster (2000) provided to some participants such an opportunity to attain the goal that was presumably activated during suppression. More specifically, they asked American undergraduates to describe a day in the life of an African American person who was presented in a photograph. Participants in the suppression condition were asked to avoid writing anything racist, whereas participants in the no-suppression condition did not receive any specific instructions. Afterward, half of the participants in each condition were assigned to the expression condition, in which they had to describe a day in the life of another African American person while taking a perspective of a racist writer. Participants in the no-expression condition did not write another story.
In terms of predictions, the authors reasoned that if a goal has been activated by the first suppression phase, then expressing the racist thoughts should constitute goal fulfillment and accessibility of racist thoughts should plummet. If, however, suppression only activated racist thought by way of semantic priming, writing a racist story should serve to further enhance such accessibility. The authors measured accessibility of racist stereotypes by presenting to participants a description of an ambiguously aggressive person and asking them to evaluate him (see Srull & Wyer, 1979) . High accessibility of racist stereotypes is reflected in higher aggressiveness ratings of the person because it has been shown that in American undergraduates, the African American stereotype is related to aggression and thus renders aggressive content accessible (see, e.g., Devine, 1989) . Replicating the phenomenon of postsuppressional rebound, in the noexpression group, participants that suppressed racism (and were given no opportunity to express it in the second phase of the study) rated the person as more aggressive than did participants who did not undergo suppression. More important, participants who first suppressed racism and then expressed it in the second phase of the study rated the ambiguously aggressive person as less aggressive than the group that did not express racism. Thus, it seems that suppressing racist thoughts had activated the goal to think those thoughts, a goal that was fulfilled and thus deactivated by further expression of these thoughts (for reviews of this research, see Förster & Liberman, 2004 . Such findings strongly point to the utility of examining patterns of activation and inhibition following presumed goal completion as a means of detecting the operation of goal priming (for another application, see Liberman, Förster, & Higgins, 2007) . In addition, the findings on suppression of thoughts illustrate that goals that are not made explicit can produce activation and postfulfillment inhibition because participants in the experiments were not aware of the fact that the goal to be racist was activated or attained. Notably, in these studies, participants' answers during thorough debriefing reflected that they neither knew that they were pursuing a goal nor that they had attained it (see Bargh, 1994) .
It is interesting to conceptualize failure as a specific case of nonfulfillment and predict that accessibility of goal-related constructs would be higher after failure than after success. Moskowitz (2002) asked participants to remember either an event of athletic failure or an event of athletic success. He reasoned that the failure condition would enhance accessibility of constructs related to athleticism. Using a Stroop-like measure of accessibility, he found an enhanced accessibility of athletic words after imagining a failure but not after imagining success. Accessibility of semantic constructs due to priming should not show a similar sensitivity to success versus failure, and therefore, those effects may serve to distinguish semantic priming from priming of goals.
Goal completion sometimes may be achieved via attaining a substitute goal (Lissner, 1933; Mahler, 1933; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982 ; see also principle 7). For example, if one fails in an exam and if this threatens the high-priority goal of being intelligent, understanding a tough passage of James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake could potentially compensate for failure in the exam and can thus reduce frustration and rumination. Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, and Dijksterhuis (1999) demonstrated that accessibility of task-related concepts after failure may be halted by self-affirmation of values unrelated to the task. In a series of experiments, they let participants fail at an ostensible intelligence task that was manipulated to be unsolvable. Failure increased accessibility of intelligence-related concepts. This enhanced accessibility, however, was not evident if, after failure, participants had a chance to affirm other subjectively important values (e.g., the value of being social or being politically involved). The results demonstrate that certain values, such as demonstrating intelligence, serve a higher order goal of "thinking positively about oneself," which can be attained by different means. After goal attainment, accessibility of the higher order goal may drop (also see Martin & Tesser, 1996; Tesser & Cornell, 1991 ; for a more critical discussion of goal fulfillment of abstract goals, see .
Substitution may be achieved by instantiating fairly broad goals, as demonstrated by research on self-affirmation (see Martin & Tesser, 1996) . According to research on self-affirmation, people strive to maintain the overall integrity of the self, and experiencing different types of failure (e.g., a failure to maintain consistency of one's attitudes) may be alleviated by an act of self-affirmation (e.g., reminding oneself of one's important values; Steele, 1988) . Recently, Koole and van Knippenberg (2006) applied this logic to suppression of stereotypes. They reasoned that suppression failures create a general sense of tension that can be reduced by self-affirmation in domains that are unrelated to the suppression content or the act of suppression. Consequently, any positive feedback on the integrity of the self should eliminate postsuppressional rebound effects because it would stop rumination on suppression failures. This is exactly what they found: After the suppression phase, participants were either given positive (e.g., "You are very social") or neutral feedback ("You are reasonably social") on a personality questionnaire they had to fill out before the suppression phase started. Those with the selfaffirming feedback showed no enhanced accessibility relative to a nonsuppression group (i.e., no rebound effect) compared to the neutral feedback suppression group. Presumably, the tension produced by the difficulty to suppress a stereotype was reduced by the self-affirming feedback. This feedback fulfilled the goal of self-affirmation and reduced accessibility of goal-related constructs. In these studies, it is unlikely that participants were aware of the content of the goal, its activation, or attainment.
In sum, we think that inhibition after goal fulfillment is an important principle for deciding whether a goal was primed. Semantic priming mechanisms cannot explain reduction in the accessibility of goal-related construct below baseline upon goal completion. Note that in most of the experiments cited above, participants explicitly mentioned the goal or goal-related concepts. For example, in the goal studies by , participants explicitly told the experimenters that they found the combination of scissors and glasses before they started working on the lexical decision task. Similarly, some participants in the Liberman and Förster (2000) studies wrote racist stories, presumably fulfilling the goal to use racist concepts that was triggered by suppression instructions, and thus frequently mentioned stereotypic concepts. By the logic of semantic priming, these should have enhanced the accessibility of goal-related constructs. Instead, goal fulfillment resulted in inhibition, that is, reduction of accessibility below baseline (see Higgins, 1996) . Of course, models of semantic priming (e.g., connectionist models; Smith & DeCoster, 1998) can predict inhibition effects. However, these models do not specify that inhibition should follow goal attainment.
Turning from semantic to procedural priming, little is known about how the latter phenomenon is affected by completion versus interruption of the priming tasks. The mechanisms that supposedly underlie procedural priming (carryover effects, see Schooler, 2002) , however, presume that its effects should not be sensitive to whether the priming task was successfully completed, interrupted, or failed.
Goal-Priming Effects Show Gradients as a Function of Distance to the Goal
A classic principle of goal-directed behavior is that motivational strength increases as distance from the goal decreases, that is, the goal looms larger as one is closer to it (Lewin, 1935; Miller, 1944 Miller, , 1959 . In a landmark study demonstrating this principle, Brown (1948) trained one group of rats to run down a short alley to attain food when hungry. Each rat wore a harness connected to a recording device such that the strength of its pull when stopped at a specific point in the alley could be measured in grams. Brown (1948) found that the animals that stopped nearer to the food pulled harder than those who were stopped farther away. Further supporting this principle, stronger motivation closer to the goal has been observed in several other studies, with both animals and humans (e.g., Förster, Grant, Idson, & Higgins, 2001; Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998; Gjesme, 1974; Hearst, 1960 Hearst, , 1962 Losco & Epstein, 1977; Miller & Kraeling, 1952; Miller & Murray, 1952; Murray & Berkun, 1955; Rigby, 1954; Smith, 1965 Smith, , 1969 .
Generally speaking, goal gradients demonstrate that goal-driven behavior is situation sensitive (in this case, it is sensitive to the changing distance to the goal). More concretely, however, this principle may serve to distinguish between priming of goals and semantic priming. Specifically, accessibility from semantic priming decreases fairly rapidly after the onset of the prime. For example,
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Srull and Wyer (1979) asked participants to judge an ambiguously aggressive target for 5 min, 1 hour, or 1 day after the priming task. After 1 hour, when the number of primes was low (6 out of 30 scrambled sentences were related to hostility), there was little or no priming effect (also see Smith & Branscombe, 1987) . When the number of primes was high, slower but still noticeable decay was observed. Decay changes dramatically, however, if accessibility stems from the activation of goals because accessibility from goals seems to remain as long as the goal is active and even increase as a function of goal proximity (see Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005) . Most prominently, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) demonstrated this principle by having participants rehearse a series of actions and then informing them that they would either perform the actions (i.e., a goal) or observe another person performing them (i.e., a non-goal). Using a recognition test, they found a higher accessibility of the actions in the goal condition than in the no-goal condition, even when rehearsal of the actions was not possible in the intervening time. A similar persistence of the effect of goals was demonstrated by Bargh and Barndollar (1996) , who activated achievement concerns and found that delay increased, rather than decreased, the effects of priming.
It may be argued that such increases in accessibility are simply due to rehearsal. For example, a person searching for his glasses in the morning might repeatedly think, "Where are my glasses, did I use them for reading? Are they near the TV? Who could have them?" thereby rendering goal-related concepts highly accessible. If so, then the lack of decay in accessibility after goal onset could simply reflect frequent (and recent) priming. To rule out this possibility, in another study, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) endowed participants with a goal and then systematically prevented them from rehearsing it by asking them to carry out a visuospatial task requiring spoken responses as participants were approaching the goal. Nevertheless, they found increased accessibility the closer participants were to the goal. Thus, it seems that decay rates from goal activation are different from those of semantic priming and that this effect cannot be reduced to simple rehearsal.
We should caution that contrary to the classic notion of goal gradients, motivation does not necessarily increase closer to the goal (for a recent discussion of this topic, see Liberman & Förster, in press); for example, our motivation to write an article does not necessarily increase as we get closer to actually writing it. A careful analysis of how distance to the goal affects value and how it affects expectancy may allow us to predict whether motivation would increase or decrease closer to the goal. For example, Construal Level Theory (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003) proposes a detailed theoretical account of how psychological distance affects value.
It suggests that the positive value of some events (e.g., having guests staying at your place for a week) is attached to the abstract, high-level construals of these events and thus would increase with distance. In contrast, value that is attached to a concrete, low-level construal of an event (e.g., having a candy) would be reduced with distance. Correspondingly, motivation and accessibility of goal-related constructs would decrease closer to a goal in the former case but increase in the latter case.
How do goal gradients help us to distinguish between primed goals and primed semantic constructs? We suggest that if postpriming accessibility changes with distance to the goal in a way that is consistent with motivation, then we may assume that in all likelihood the prime activated a goal rather than only produced semantic priming.
Goal-Priming Effects Are Proportional to the Product of Expectancy and Value
As alluded to earlier, classic theories of motivation state that motivation increases with the expectancy of reaching a goal and with the goal's value. This basic premise underlies expected utility theory in economics and decision making (e.g., Edwards, 1951 ), Atkinson's (1964) theory of achievement motivation, the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974) , and Vroom's (1966) theory of motivation in organizational settings, among others. Of course, expectancy and value are not always independent, especially in achievement situations (see Croizer, 1979; Filer, 1952; Irwin, 1953; Teevan, Burdick, & Stoddard, 1976) . But even in these domains, the expectancy-value model of motivation prevails, and it is assumed that both expectancy and value are required for goal commitment and that they combine multiplicatively (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944; Tolman, 1955; Vroom, 1964 ; for a review, see Feather & Newton, 1982; Mitchell, 1982) . For example, according to the expectancy-value model, an applicant's motivation to apply for a job position would increase with the job's attractiveness and the estimated chances of getting the position. Furthermore, obviously, the expectancy-value model specifies that expectancy and value combine in a multiplicative way to determine motivation. Thus, if the job is not attractive (i.e., attractiveness approaches zero), then motivation to apply would be low no matter how likely one is to get the job. In a similar way, if there are virtually no chances of getting the job, motivation to apply would remain low even if the job is rather attractive. Based on expectancy-value models of motivation, we predict that both accessibility of goal-related constructs and inhibition after goal fulfillment would increase as a function of the interaction of the perceived likelihood and value of goal attainment.
Despite its central conceptual role in earlier work on motivation, although the effect of goal value has received considerable attention in the social cognitive literature regarding behavioral priming, the effect of expectancy and the multiplicative effect of expectancy and value has been relatively underinvestigated. However, there have been some noteworthy exceptions. For example, Levy (1996) subliminally primed old and young participants with either positive elderly stereotypic words (e.g., wisdom) or negative elderly stereotypic words (e.g., senility). Memory performance was assessed both before and after priming. Assimilation effects occurred for elderly participants (i.e., reduced performance after negative primes and enhanced performance after positive primes) but not for young participants. One possible explanation of these results is that the primes contained expectations about one's own performance as a member of the primed group of the elderly. For an elderly participant, but not for a young participant, a prime induced a corresponding expectancy (i.e., to perform poorly when primed with senility and to perform well when primed with wisdom; cf. Steele & Aronson, 1995;  for research showing that stereotypic expectancies can decrease as well as enhance performance, see Brown & Josephs, 1999; Seibt & Förster, 2004 ; see reviews by Shapiro & Neuberg, in press; Wheeler & Petty, 2001) . Of importance, the lack of a priming influence on younger participants may reflect the fact that for this group the primes were irrelevant-it is reasonable to suggest that 20-year-old participants simply do not care about senile amnesia and thus the priming did not have any effect. In general, these findings may be interpreted as suggesting that expectancies can be activated unconsciously and influence overt performance if they are relevant to the self. also have recently reported results strongly suggesting that behavioral priming should exhibit expectancy-based moderation. As discussed earlier, found that goal-related accessibility and postfulfillment inhibition were proportional to the motivation to achieve a goal. Again, in their experiments, participants were instructed to search through a presented series of pictures for a target combination (glasses followed by scissors) and to report it to the experimenter. As noted before, the results reflected increased accessibility of goal-related words before the combination was found and inhibition after the combination was found compared to a group of participants that only watched the pictures without the goal to find the target combination. Moreover, in some studies (Förster et al., 2005, Experiments 4-6) , the authors manipulated the expectancy of achieving the goal (by telling participants that the target combination was present in 90% of the cases vs. only in 5% of the cases), the value of the goal (by telling participants that they would receive €1.00 vs. only €0.05 for finding the combination), or both expectancy and value. The experiments also included a no-goal, control group that merely saw the pictures without the goal of finding the target combination. As predicted, accessibility of goal-related words prior to fulfillment and inhibition after fulfillment were found in the high-expectancy and high-value conditions but not in the low-expectancy and low-value conditions. The combination of high value and high expectancy enhanced the effects. Therefore, the effects of expectancy and value on goal-related accessibility and on postfulfillment inhibition were interactive (i.e., multiplicative) and similar to the effects of expectancy and value on motivation (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Vroom, 1966) . To the extent that behavioral priming effects are engendered by accessible goals, these results suggest that expectancies regarding goal attainment should play a critical role in determining the occurrence and magnitude of such effects.
In regard to previously discussed motivational principles, semantic priming is not expected to be sensitive to the interaction of expectancy and value. For example, the extent to which "light" semantically primes "lamp" should not vary as a function of the interaction between the desirability of turning on the light and the expectancy (e.g., feasibility) of doing so. Theories of semantic priming or procedural priming as well as the perception-behavior link are silent with respect to the interaction of expectancy and value.
Let us now turn to three more principles that have been suggested as uniquely characteristic of cognitive representations of goals , namely, goal shielding, involvement of self-control processes, and multi-and equifinality.
Goal-Priming Effects Involve Inhibition of Conflicting Goals
While pursuing a goal, one may be sidetracked by other goals. We have all experienced going to another room to get a nail clipper (or wristwatch, glasses, husband, etc.) and then forgetting about the original goal and finding ourselves pursuing another goal (e.g., once in the kitchen, we might start emptying the dishwasher). This effect, which was recently attributed to deficits in working memory (Baddeley, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003) , can very generally be interpreted as a loss of concentration or loss of one's focus on the original goal. Alternative goals, which may be triggered by cues both from the outside (e.g., the kitchen one went to looking for the nail clipper) and from the inside (e.g., remembering an unfinished paper), can distract us from pursuing the original goal. Very often, however, we seem to pursue our goals to completion, despite the
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distracting environment and our simultaneous engagement in many other pressing tasks. Obviously, in order to enable successful completion of one goal, the selfregulatory system needs to put other simultaneously active goals on hold. Could that system operate out of awareness and automatically shift the priority of activated goals? Goal Systems Theory (GST; Kruglanski et al., 2002; provides a positive answer to that question.
According to GST, goals form a hierarchical network with superordinate goals associatively linked to both subordinate goals (i.e., means) as well as competing or complementary superordinate goals. These networks may or may not correspond, either partly or fully, to semantic networks. For example, the goal of buying groceries may be subordinate to a higher level goal of preparing a party and superordinate to the means of driving a car to the supermarket, but this would by no means suggest that the semantic constructs of "groceries," "party," and "car" need be analogously linked with one another, if at all. GST generates the prediction that means should activate the goals they subserve and that goals should activate the means that subserve them. Indeed, Kruglanski et al. (2002) have shown, using subliminal priming, that lexical decision times for goalrelated means were faster after priming goals and lexical decisions for goals were faster after means were primed. Moreover, increased accessibility of the goal due to priming of means was associated with increased task persistence and better performance , reflecting the existence of a direct relationship between success in goal pursuit and the strength of the connection between means and goals.
Beyond these basic tenets, GST also predicts the existence of inhibitory links between competing goals, a phenomenon labeled "goal shielding." Goal shielding occurs when mental representations of alternative potentially competing goals are inhibited by the mere activation of a focal goal. To demonstrate the existence of this phenomenon, subliminally primed participants with words representing goals that they intended to pursue (e.g., studying, reading, running, skiing) in a lexical decision paradigm. Specifically, following suboptimal exposure to either these goal primes or control primes (e.g., representing goals they did not intend to pursue), participants were asked to make speeded responses to targets that represented either competing goals or control goals. As predicted, it was found that when goals were primed, reaction times to competing goals were slowed, relative to reaction times to control goals, suggesting that the mere activation of a goal automatically suppresses the accessibility of goals that stand to interfere with its pursuit. Critically, this shielding effect was only obtained for primed goals to which participants were highly committed and for which protection from interference would therefore be most imperative. Moreover, when target stimuli represented goals that would not stand to compete with focal goal attainment, the shielding effect was eradicated, again reflecting its presumed functional utility in self-regulation.
Of most pertinence to the current discussion, as they presently stand, models of semantic priming are incapable of accounting for inhibitory effects of this ilk. If only semantic or associative priming were at play in the paradigm devised by Shah and his colleagues, then the subliminally primed, goal-related constructs (e.g., playing football) should have, if anything, facilitated response times to competing goal constructs (e.g., baseball) by dint of shared semantic category membership or because both prime and target goal constructs were associatively linked by the very way of their competitive relationship. Moreover, traditional spreading activation (as well as connectionist) models would be hard-pressed to explain why goal commitment enhanced the inhibition effect. It might be argued that words representing committed goals were more emotionally engrossing, thereby capturing greater attention and slowing responses to target words. However, this account would have difficulty explaining why the shielding effect was reduced when targets represented goals that were noncompetitive with the focal goal. Moreover, given the subliminal priming procedures most prominently employed, it is unlikely that participants were distracted to an extent sufficient to reliably retard their responses. also soundly replicated the goal-shielding effect using supraliminal primes, arguing against the possibility that participants were slowed in their responses to target stimuli by their attempts to discern the identities of the masked goal primes.
Upon consideration, there are numerous instances of inhibitory cognitive processing that may be seen as involving suppression of cognitive material that stands to interfere with goal-directed behavior. For instance, in the area of psycholinguistics, it has been found that homonyms initially activate all available semantic meanings (e.g., the word bank activates both the meaning of a financial institution and the meaning of a riverside). However, once a context is determined, the context-irrelevant meanings become inhibited (Swinney, Prather, & Love, 2000) . Here, the inhibition that ultimately results in such procedures may be seen as crucial to satisfying the goal of semantically disambiguating the sentence at hand-to the extent that alternative meanings were to remain accessible, confusion would linger. Likewise, in the retrieval-induced, forgetting paradigm (Anderson & Bjork, 1994) , during a study phase, participants encode several categorized lists, each composed of several exemplars in a category-exemplar format (e.g., fruit-orange). After the study phase, participants engage in directed retrieval practice for half of the items from half of the studied categories. In this phase, they complete category-plus-exemplar stem cue tests (e.g., fruit-or___). After a retention interval, a final and unexpected category-cued recall test is administered in which participants are cued with each category name and are asked to reproduce any exemplar of that category that they remember from any point in the experiment. It is typically found that performance on practiced items improves relative to the baseline condition (i.e., items from unpracticed categories), whereas performance on the unpracticed items from practiced categories falls below this baseline. Anderson and Bjork (1994) have explained these effects by suggesting that during the retrieval practice phase, the practiced items compete with the unpracticed items from the same category and thus inhibit them (see also Anderson & Neely, 1996; Anderson & Spellman, 1995) . Again, this may be reconstrued, in motivational terms, as suggesting that material is cognitively suppressed that stands to interfere with attaining the goal of retrieving the practiced items. However, it is also possible that phenomena of this sort do not actually entail activation of mentally represented goals. Perceptual systems may simply be hardwired to inhibit information that stands to undermine stable identification of a given percept. So, for instance, upon encountering the homograph bank, when a particular interpretation is more probable, the brain suppresses activation of less probable alternatives, irrespective of whether any "stimulus interpretation" or "word comprehension" goal has been activated or has ever been represented. A kindred example would be perception of ambiguous figures such as the familiar Necker cubethe perceptual system simply uses available cues to compute the most likely configuration for the stimulus and suppresses activation of information that would promote a conflicting perceptual organization. This process may not, and to our knowledge has never been presumed to, entail activation of a mentally represented goal to "disambiguate the sensory image." Therefore, although it is certainly possible that goal activation may contribute to a wide variety of inhibitory phenomenon for which motivational accounts have not previously been invoked, the existence of said contribution remains controversial and cries out for empirical scrutiny. As such, for the sake of parsimony, we propose that inhibition of goal-incompatible material can only be confidently ascribed to goal priming when the mere activation of a goal construct representing a desired end state to which an individual is highly committed automatically shields itself via suppression of the accessibility of competing goal constructs.
Goal-Priming Effects Involve Self-Control
Implementation of many abstract, long-term goals often is impeded by the necessity of overcoming concrete, momentary temptations. For instance, individuals oftentimes are tempted to overeat when trying to maintain a diet, watch TV when trying to read a paper, smoke when attempting to quit, or more generally take a smaller but sooner reward at the expense of a larger one later (Ainslie, 1992; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Rachlin, 1995 Rachlin, , 1996 Rachlin, , 1997 Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990; Trope & Fishbach, 2000) . Such self-control dilemmas may be viewed as conflicts between the behavioral implications of a low-level construal (specific, local view) of a situation and the behavioral implications of a high-level (i.e., general, abstract) construal of a situation (Fujita et al., 2006) .
Given this definition, goal shielding, as discussed above, may be understood as a special case of selfcontrol inasmuch as the nonfocal, background goal may be thought of as following from a lower level construal of the situation than that following from the focal, primary goal (Trope & Liberman, 2000) . In that sense, the background goals or action tendencies may be conceptualized as temptations that one is trying to overcome to pursue the more important, focal goal. Nevertheless, we believe that self-control deserves some special attention in view of its vital importance in people's lives. Unlike the more general case of distracting goals, which may be imposed by situations and therefore unforeseeable (e.g., one does not know that the goal to get clippers from the kitchen would be subverted by a competing goal to have a cup of coffee), classic self-control situations tend to involve a specific distracting goal that may be known in advance. For example, people know that their attempts to diet could be sabotaged by a dessert in a restaurant or that TV interferes with studying or that fear and laziness might prevent them from getting an HIV test.
Knowing in advance the specific impediment to goal attainment allows people to preemptively employ selfcontrol strategies that aim at counteracting the potential temptations. A person might try to eliminate the temptations, to detract from their attractiveness, or to bolster the attractiveness of the higher level goal (Fishbach & Trope, 2001) . For example, research shows that people may impose on themselves penalties for failing to act according to their long-term outcomes (Ainslie, 1975; Förster et al. / GOAL AND NON-GOAL PRIMING 225 Becker, 1960) . These self-imposed penalties may then serve as deterrents against failure to act according to the higher level goal. People also may opt to change future choice situations by making rewards contingent on acting according to one's long-term interests. Thus, instead of receiving a reward unconditionally, people may prefer to receive it only if they act according to their longterm interests. For example, one may prefer to receive a bonus for actually completing an HIV test than for merely agreeing to do it. In making penalties and rewards contingent on performing an activity, people precommit themselves to the higher level goal (Brickman, 1987) , often making their decision to act according to their higher level goals irreversible (Ainslie, 1975; Green & Rachlin, 1996; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Schelling, 1978; Strotz, 1956; Thaler, 1994; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) . Other self-control strategies involve bolstering the value of the higher level goals (Mischel, 1984) , for example, by linking their attainment to important self-standards. Failure to choose according to long-term outcomes is then construed as a violation of one's central values and a threat to one's sense of selfworth and self-determination.
It seems that most of these strategies involve conscious processes. Moreover, research on ego-depletion has demonstrated that self-control takes up extensive cognitive resources and, in that sense, cannot be automatic. Indeed, self-control decreases as a function of fatigue, concurrent activities, and negative affect (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; ; see also Fishbach & Trope, 2001) . It is still possible, however, that some of these self-control strategies would operate in an unconscious manner. Could self-control processes come into play in the activation and inhibition of goal representations and thereby in automatic behavioral priming? Could self-control strategies themselves be activated outside of awareness?
Recent research by Fishbach, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2003) provides a positive answer to both of these questions. Based on GST, Fishbach et al. (2003) argued that when situationally enticed to pursue short-term goals representing temptations (e.g., use of illegal drugs, engagement in premarital sex), people activate superordinate goals (e.g., academic achievement, adhering to religious mores) to aid self-control. To test their hypothesis, the authors subliminally primed temptation-related words (e.g., drugs, sex) and found that participants were significantly faster to make lexical decisions about words related to the higher order goals with which these temptations stood to interfere (e.g., grades, bible) than when primed with control words associated with temptations that were irrelevant to these goals. Attesting to the automaticity (in this case, efficiency; see Bargh, 1994 ) of the effect, temptation-goal activation also was shown to occur under high cognitive load and when the stimulus onset asynchrony (the delay between prime and target presentation) was set at merely 67 ms, decreasing the likelihood that controlled processing could take place.
Critically, Fishbach et al. (2003) took pains to demonstrate that their effect was self-regulatory in nature. First, they showed that whereas temptation primes facilitated goal response times, suggesting that momentary allurements automatically trigger activation of overriding goals, goal primes were, if anything, found in the same designs to inhibit activation of temptations (thereby pointing to a goal-shielding process; . The discovery of this crossover pattern, which appears functional for selfcontrol, suggests that cognitive links between temptation and overriding goal representations are forged during the course of practice in self-regulation. If Fishbach et al. (2003) had, for instance, found an ordinal interaction, with temptations rapidly activating goals and goals less rapidly activating temptations, their effect may have been accounted for without any invocation of motivational processes. For example, they might have posited that temptations and the goals with which they interfere are hierarchically linked with numerous low-level or concrete temptations associated with a given high-level or abstract goal. At least with regard to semantic associations of this hierarchical nature, it has been argued that the higher level representations should facilitate the lower level representations to a lesser extent than vice versa (e.g., "robin" primes "bird" faster than "bird" primes "robin"-a "fan" effect; Anderson, 1976 Anderson, , 1983 ; however, given that Fishbach et al. (2003) found not only diminished facilitation but inhibition of temptations by goals, this nonmotivational account was rendered comparatively unparsimonious (i.e., certainly "bird" shouldn't inhibit "robin" the way goals inhibit temptations). Beyond this, Fishbach et al. (2003) also demonstrated that temptation-goal activation was facilitated by increased commitment to the overriding goal and increased expectancy of self-regulatory success, two critical motivational variables. Altogether, their work (for an example of automatic self-control regarding stereotyping, see also Moskowitz et al., 1999) strongly suggests that automatic processes in resisting temptation, processes that are adaptive for self-regulation, may be endemic to goal systems but may not function within representational networks based solely on semantic or temporal associations. As such, documentation of the operation of such processes may provide yet another means of distinguishing automatic goal-priming effects from effects that do not involve goals.
Goal-Priming Effects Are Moderated by Equifinality and Multifinality
Sometimes, an individual may have multiple means of achieving the same goal. For example, it is possible to get to work by taxi, bus, or bike. This is a case of what has been termed "equifinality" . It is also possible that the same means serves more than one goal: One can ride a bike for transportation, exercise, or entertainment. This is the case of "multifinality." As discussed above, GST predicts that goals and means are linked and that one can elicit the other. It also predicts that the extent to which a goal activates a given means is inversely related to the number of means that are connected to that goal. Likewise, it is predicted that the extent to which a means activates a goal is inversely related to the number of goals that are connected to that means. Equifinality and multifinality may vary across situations. For example, our diet may be more restricted when we are sick than when we are healthy, and the concept "eat" would activate more foods in the latter than in the former case. As another example of crosscontextual variation, during the weekend, biking may more strongly activate "fun" than on a weekday, when a bicycle also is likely to be used to drive to work.
To assess their predictions, Kruglanski and his colleagues (2002) have frequently employed modified sequential priming paradigms. For instance, in one study, they asked participants to list three personal attributes that represented goals they wanted to attain and one possible attribute that represented a goal they currently were not trying to attain. Participants also were asked to list one activity they could perform to attain each of the four attributes, representing possible means to attain the goals. They were then asked to list all the activities they could think of that would help them to attain each of the goals. Finally, participants worked on a lexical decision task in which they were asked to determine whether a word was a goal (attribute) or a means (activity). The four goals listed by the participant and the first means listed for each goal were randomly included in the presented set of prime and target words. Links for each attribute could then be assessed by examining reaction times when the goal was the prime for the means. First, the study showed that accessibility of means was higher when goals were primed compared to when non-goals were primed. Note that in itself, this result could reflect both purely semantic associations as well as goal activation. However, the results further showed that this goal-priming effect disappeared when the primed goal was one that participants were not currently pursuing, that is, when it was available in long-term memory but when commitment to the goal was minimal. This commitment-or valuebased moderation implicates the operation of selfregulatory processes (as suggested by the current principle 1). Finally, in line with the equifinality-related predictions of goal network theory, data from the same study also revealed that the lower the number of activities participants listed or, in other words, the greater the uniqueness of the goal-means connection (i.e., the less equifinality it possessed), the more accessible was the first means listed (as indicated by speeded lexical decision time) after it was primed with the corresponding goal. It would be difficult to account for such structural effects on construct accessibility without positing the existence of a separate network of goal representations linked to one another in a manner that is functional for self-regulation.
With regard to our current analysis, a particularly interesting implication of goal network theory is that multiple goals can work in the background with little or no conscious awareness. Kruglanski et al. (2002) argue that in multifinal goal structures, where a given means subserves multiple goals, this state of affairs sometimes leads to cases in which actions are misattributed to a focal goal (i.e., one of which the individual is aware) when they were in fact driven by unconscious background goals that could be attained using the same means.
For instance, in one recent study by Chun, Kruglanski, Sleeth-Kepller, & Friedman (under review) participants were presented with an array of four pairs of identical athletic socks labeled "A," "B," "C," and "D" from left to right and were provided with the focal goal of choosing the one that seemed to be of the best quality (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . To create a fairly surreptitious background goal, participants in one condition were placed under time pressure, engendering the secondary objective of reaching quick closure on their decision. In a second condition, participants were given accuracy instructions to reduce their need for closure (see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) . It was found that participants in whom a need for closure was instilled demonstrated a relatively pronounced tendency to select one of the pairs of socks they had most recently examined (here, the rightmost socks in the array), as would be expected given the motive to quickly reach a decision. No such tendency was found among those in whom a need to avoid closure had been instilled. However, when carefully asked, participants, who again were assigned the focal goal of choosing based on quality alone, seemed entirely unaware that they had been influenced by the time pressure or accuracy instructions. Rather, even though they reported the reason(s) for their selection under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality, they wholly justified their choices Förster et al. / GOAL AND NON-GOAL PRIMING 227 using quality-related arguments (e.g., "[the rightmost pair] appeared more durable"; "the material was thicker in the padding"). These findings suggest that the need for or against closure operated largely, if not entirely, out of the participants' awareness, influencing participants' choices when the behavioral options at hand allowed them to fulfill their implicit background goals using the same "multifinal" means that would satisfy their conscious focal goal. In essence, active background goals fairly automatically altered the value of a multifinal behavioral option, thereby influencing action in a manner that was not privy to conscious awareness. Critically, models of semantic or procedural priming are yet again silent regarding how explicit and latent motives might interact to shape decision making in this fashion.
Equifinality is related to another important characteristic of the goal system, which is the ability to engage in means substitution. When an action fails, people typically seek alternative, equifinal means to satisfy the same superordinate goal. For example, if a taxi did not arrive to take me to the airport, I might seek alternative ways to get there and take my car. Note that such alternative means could have been inhibited prior to the failure of the initial means (i.e., before the taxi failed to arrive, I could have inhibited driving my own car) but a failure of one route could disinhibit the formerly inhibited means. To the best of our knowledge, means substitution and disinhibition of formerly inhibited means have never been demonstrated with accessibility measures or with automatic goals. However, we argue that if observed, such effects would constitute another difference between goal activation and semantic priming. A semantic system would not explain why a situational change in affordances (e.g., the failure of a taxi to arrive) disinhibited an alternative means (e.g., driving my own car).
CONCLUSION
In this article, we suggested seven principles that we believe constitute hallmarks of human self-regulation and thus may help to distinguish between semantic priming and goal priming. We by no means suggest that these principles are exhaustive, and we do not consider their boundaries to be clear. Some principles may include aspects of others, and some processes that have been subsumed within one principle may overlap with processes primarily associated with another. Many of them have been discussed in recent work on goal pursuit Moskowitz et al., 2004; Wheeler & Petty, 2001 ), and we thought it important to integrate them and discuss them more fully with regard to their implications for social psychological research on goal priming. We believe that these are important principles that might serve as guidelines for deciding whether a given priming effect did or did not involve goal-based mediation. They also might provide a platform for further discussions on automatic goal pursuit, a phenomenon that is still quite controversial (see Moskowitz et al., 2004; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) .
We believe that without empirical markers, such as the ones implied in this article, any claims regarding goal versus semantic priming will remain a matter of theoretical taste. As a matter of fact, without such principles, theoretical interpretations in terms of automatic goal pursuit will remain nonfalsifiable. Thus, even though alternative principles could be proposed and even though automatic and controlled goal pursuit may differ with regard to some of the proposed principles (see our discussion on this issue below), theoretical commitment to any such principles is still a necessary precondition for scientifically sound research on automatic goal pursuit.
We hasten to add that the principles are sufficient but not necessary conditions for inferring primed goals. In other words, if borne out empirically, the phenomena outlined in our principles would strongly suggest a primed goal. Not finding them, however, does not exclude the possibility of a primed goal. For example, suppose that we find that the value of "neighbor" changes from neutral to positive and back to neutral with the activation and fulfillment of the goal to assemble furniture because the only way to fulfill the goal is to borrow a screwdriver from the neighbor. We can then conclude that a goal has been primed. However, a failure to find such an effect would not allow us to infer the absence of a primed goal.
What do these principles have in common? In other words, what is it about goal activation that distinguishes it from activation of semantic constructs? We have taken a very broad perspective in attempting to answer this question, suggesting that goals follow an instrumental logic rather than an associative or semantic logic. Furthermore, we would like to suggest that there are two major components to instrumentality: instrumental allocation of resources and instrumental relations. Let us discuss these in turn.
Instrumental allocation of resources. Goals and needs involve resource mobilization, spending energy to achieve something that is important to people, something about which people care. Related to this notion is the idea that the intensity of goal pursuit and the phenomena that derive from it, such as accessibility of goalrelated constructs and the value of the means, change with the subjective attractiveness or importance of goal attainment (goal value), with its expectancy, and with their interaction (principles 1 and 4). As a result of these, it also changes as a function of distance to the goal and after goal attainment (principle 3).
Instrumental value refers to value for goal attainment as opposed to other sources of value (e.g., beauty). A primed goal would enhance the value of instrumental means even if these are not otherwise associated to it. Furthermore, a goal prime would enhance the value of instrumental means prior to attainment but not after attainment. For example, we could predict that if a person is primed with "success" at a conference, then her portable disk will become more valuable to her, but no such effect occurs outside of the conference context. Similar effects should be predicted for the accessibility of constructs that are related to the talk (for a related point, see Wheeler et al., in press ). We also could predict that after the talk is over, both value of means and accessibility of goal-related constructs would decrease (principles 1 and 2).
Instrumental relations between goals. Principles 5, 6, and 7 reflect the instrumental relations between goals, relations that form a network composed of hierarchies of subordinate and superordinate goals, a network that may or may not correspond to associative or semantic networks. Goals inhibit conflicting goals. Conflict may arise between goals with no a priori relationship but that potentially compete for resources, thereby giving rise to inhibition of nonfocal goals (e.g., inhibition of the goal of cooking when writing a review; principle 5). Conflict also may arise between a higher level and a lower level goal, as is the case in self-control dilemmas (principle 6). Goals facilitate hierarchically linked subordinate and superordinate goals, that is, mental representations of means and ends facilitate each other (principle 7). Goal hierarchies only partially reflect the associative (or, for that matter, semantic) network. For example, the fact that "diet" is connected to "chocolate" possibly reflects both a cold cognitive association as well as a goal-network relation (i.e., between a higher level goal and a temptation). However, if "study" is connected to "niece" because on a particular day playing with my baby niece is the primary distracter that prevents me from studying, then an associative explanation is less likely.
Automatic and Controlled Goal Pursuit
Another interesting question is whether conscious and unconscious goal pursuit follow the same mechanisms. Our analysis rests on the assumption that they are similar with respect to the basic processes that are reflected in our principles. Indeed, many of the principles we outlined were demonstrated with automatic goals. However, other views are possible. For example, research on implicit versus explicit attitude measures has shown that they may reflect quite different psychological processes (see, e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) . Future research may uncover differences between automatic and controlled goal pursuit not only with respect to whether any of the principles we outlined applies to them but also with respect to the extent and scope of such application. For example, it may be interesting to examine whether inhibition of goal-related constructs is stronger after conscious rather than unconscious goal attainment. It also may be interesting to investigate whether discrepancies between actual and desired states can be induced unconsciously or, rather, need to be experienced consciously to trigger goaldirected activity. Finally, it might be the case that conscious goals, but not primed goals, cause value to change in the course of goal activation and goal attainment. This would imply that some primed goals would not show the pattern of value change described in our first principle.
In conclusion, a great many issues remain to be empirically addressed with respect to the differentiation of goals from other mental representations as well as regarding the dynamics of goal activation and pursuit. Clearly, many of the lines of research we have marshaled in support of our provisional criteria for the identification of goal-priming effects remain in their infancy. As new discoveries emerge, the seven principles at hand will undoubtedly have to be amended and novel principles devised to more adequately represent the inner workings of the breathtakingly complex yet hitherto underexplored goal-representation systems that ultimately shape human action.
NOTES
1. An alternative, nonmotivational account is that activated concepts influence the interpretation of ambiguous cues (e.g., the prime "aggression" promotes interpretations of ambiguous behavior as aggressive, which in turn leads to aggressive responses; see Wheeler & Petty, 2001 ). We will withhold comprehensive discussion of it because it does not apply to most of the effects on which our principles bear.
2. All of the priming phenomena discussed at present entail unintentional activation of goals and, as such, always reflect some modicum of automaticity. In some of the studies we discuss, other processes involved in goal pursuit also may be automatic (Bargh, 1994) , specifically, goal pursuit and even goal attainment may be efficient (i.e., may be carried out under cognitive load or distraction) or unconscious (i.e., participants do not know that they are pursuing a goal or that they have attained it).
3. Some researchers assume a chronically active interpretation goal. We would not discuss this possibility, however, because we do not think that such a chronic, ever-active goal possesses the characteristics of goals, which typically undergo activation, fulfillment, and inhibition after fulfillment. For example, it would be uninformative to suggest that people are constantly in the state of misunderstanding and that their need to interpret is never satisfied. Of course, an interpretation goal may be activated, frustrated, and satisfied, but it is not informative to assume that it is always present.
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4. Notably, this change of value is implied in Wheeler, DeMarree, and Petty's (in press) notion of "active selves." A person's active self (as opposed to the chronic, stable self) is a part of the self-concept that is highly accessible in the situation. For example, a Buddhist driving a Harley Davidson may have an aggressive self-concept rendered more accessible when driving a Harley than when entering a temple. Such changes in the self can further determine which motivational or behavioral representations will guide behavior. We add to this notion the goal relevance. For example, the Buddhist may find peaceful means of behavior more goal relevant in a temple than when driving a Harley and thus may more readily activate peaceful thoughts and behavior in the temple because the latter stands to facilitate the goal at hand.
